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Abstract  The aim of fisheries management is to avoid over-investment in fleet
capacity and over-exploitation of economically exploitable fish stocks. In this
paper a model is developed where a (big) share of rents created by control ac-
crues to boat owners while costs are covered by the general public, which also
gets a (small) share of the rent. The distribution of rent is governed by adminis-
trative rule which opens the possibility of profitable rent seeking. Cost of control
is assumed to increase as rent per boat increases. Control outlays are assumed
to be determined so as to maximize gains to the general public. It is shown that
the optimal size of the fishing fleet exceeds the size that maximizes fishery rent.
It is also shown that the higher the share that accrues to the general public, the
closer the optimal fleet size is to the rent-maximizing fleet size.
Key words   Fishing fleet capacity, fishing fleet regulation, resource rent dissi-
pation, resource rent distribution.
Introduction
Economists have known for a long time that the implication of having the most eco-
nomically viable fish stocks held in common is a tendency towards over-investment
in fishing capacity.1 This tendency is accelerated by the dwindling cost of fishing ef-
fort due to rapid technological progress. Hence, modern fishing technology is far too
efficient to allow all those who are skilled to try their luck at fishing. In response to
this over-capacity, several modes of fisheries management have been subject to con-
sideration and experimentation in various parts of the world. A common defect can
be observed with most systems: In spite of regulation, fleets tend to remain larger
than optimal. Fishery management systems that are designed to optimize the size of
the fishing fleet in fact do not do so, if judged by experience thus far.2 Hence, it
seems that there are forces at work that affect the size of fishing fleets that do not
respond “correctly” to the instruments of fisheries management.
Few attempts have been made to incorporate government regulations as an en-
dogenous part of models of commercial fisheries. The paper by Homans and Wilen
(forthcoming) is an exemption to that rule. They develop a dynamic model where
regulators set harvest quotas to ensure stock safety: when biomass is below the de-
sired long run stock level, the harvest quota is set below natural growth so that the
stock grows. When biomass is above desired long run stock level, the harvest quota
is set above natural growth of the stock so that the stock declines. Fishing capacity
enters the industry as long as resource rents are positive. Hence, in equilibrium all
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resource rent is dissipated. In the Homans and Wilen model, regulators decide sea-
son length depending on fleet capacity and stock biomass in order to reach the de-
sired harvest quota. Hence, their model is tailored to address questions concerned
with the North American regulatory regime where season length is a fundamental
parameter. Size of the fleet is not an explicit concern of the regulators.
In Iceland, as in a few other countries, fisheries management is based on an In-
dividual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. Under an ITQ regime each eligible boat
owner is allotted a given share of the total allowable catch. Boat owners are not re-
stricted as to how they utilize their quota. They can keep, rent, hire, buy, or sell their
quotas. Hence, one would expect that an effective and unrestricted trade in catch
shares would eliminate redundant fleet capacity. The present paper tries to establish
that the problem of big fishing fleets may also exist under an ITQ management re-
gime by taking explicitly into account that the rules of the ITQ system must be en-
forced. The model developed in the paper takes into account that rule enforcement is
costly and must be conducted by a public agency. Pecuniary gains from regulator
control mostly accrue to boat owners while the lion’s share of costs are covered by
the public at large.3 The distribution of rent is governed by administrative rule,
which opens the possibility of profitable rent seeking. Cost of control is assumed to
increase as the rent per boat increases. Regulators are assumed to measure control
outlays so as to maximize gains to the general public. Hence, in the present paper
regulators take a different view from the more narrow stock safety rule assumed in
the Homans and Wilen paper. This paper shows that, when enforcement-costs and
fishery-rent distribution are taken into account, then the optimal size of the fishing
fleet exceeds the size of the fleet that maximizes the fishery rent. It is also shown
that the higher the share of the fishery rent created that accrues to the general public
is, the closer the optimal fleet size is to the rent-maximizing fleet size.
Model
Assume that the steady state4 quantity of catch can be written as:
y = n(1 – n) (1)
Define y as the quantity of fish brought ashore and n as an index for fishing capacity
(also referred to, in an inexact manner, as number of boats). It is assumed that
0 ≤  n ≤  1. Equation (1) can be viewed as the sustained-yield function of a simplified
version of the Schaefer model [see Conrad and Clark (1987), p. 68]. This is a gross
simplification as compared to the real life relation between capacity and steady state
catch, but captures the basic idea that if effort is not extended there is no catch (i.e.,
if n = 0, then y = 0). The stock is over-exploited at high utilization levels and may
even disappear, at least in an economic sense.
3 Control costs and cost of rent seeking are not easily estimated. A rough estimate is that the Icelandic
government spends as much, or more, on fisheries management as, for example, on the University of
Iceland. Norway uses, according to NOU 1996:9, p. 219, four to five times as much money to control a
fishery of comparable size, which indicates that the Icelandic control costs will increase in the years to
come. Gains from the Icelandic management system, adopted in rudimentary form in 1984 and refined
almost every year since, have hardly begun to accrue to public funds.
4 By choosing a steady state formulation many important aspects are side-stepped. In a dynamic setup,
rational agents might choose to conduct fishing now rather than conserve and reap proceeds later. The
model presented does not take account of considerations of this kind. These considerations have been
left out in the present model for the purpose of simplification. The author believes reformulating the
model to take account of these inter-temporal considerations would entail unnecessary complications.Why Fishing Fleets Tend to be “Too Big” 175
Harvesting costs increase with increased capacity, so with output prices normalized
to unity, gross profits (or before tax profits) for all fishing firms may be written as:
Π  = y – kn (2)
where k is some constant proportional to the cost of operating a given unit of effort.
Free access to the fisheries implies that whatever extra profits might exist in the in-
dustry at a given time will be lost through competition, so that profits under free ac-














Condition (3) implies that if the fishery is to be economically viable the cost of op-
erating a unit of effort should be within certain limits. Condition (3) also implies
that the free access number of boats increases when cost of operating the fleet de-
creases and vice versa. Compare the free access number of boats to the number of
boats that would maximize the fishery rent [sometimes called the sole owner solu-
















Hence, if the fishery is economically viable (k < 1), then the number of boats that
would maximize the fishery rent (nΠ ) is less than the number of boats operating un-
der free access.5 Observe also that if the fishery is economically viable, then it can
be stated that the free access situation implies that all fishery rent is lost through
competition.6 Thus, if it were possible to restrict access to the fisheries, extra rent
could be earned. Proceeds might accrue to the general public as well as to the boat
owners, but this will depend, among other things, on how regulation is organized.
Regulation could possibly increase the welfare of some citizens without reducing
the welfare of others.
Regulation, Apportioning Rights at Virtually no Charge
Assume now that a government establishes a regulatory regime that restricts access
to the fishery by administrative rules. Assume further that the profits from the fish-
eries are divided between the owners of the fishing firms and the others in the propor-
tions P and (1 – P) respectively. How this division comes about is not important, but it
might be useful to think of the portion accruing to the general public as taxes generated
from the general tax system that would not be generated in the absence of regula-
tion. In other words, there are no industry specific taxes on the fishery in this setup.
5 In this simple model, free access implies that the fishing fleet is twice the size of the optimal fleet.
Note that this result should be interpreted qualitatively rather than quantitatively.
6 By definition we have that free access rent can be written as: Π FA = yFA – knFA where yFA is the sustainable
yield associated with effort level nFA. Inserting from equation (1) yields that Π FA = nFA(1 – nFA) – knFA. Further
inserting from (3) yields that Π FA = nFA(1 – nFA – k) = (1 – k)(1 – k – [1 – k]) = 0 as stated in the main text.Matthiasson 176
Rights to fish are regulated by some kind of licensing. Licensing is worthless if
it is not followed up with control. Controls are not performed without cost. The con-
trol unit must keep at bay any would-be boat owners and established boat owners
who want to extend their activity.7 The intensity with which those “newcomers”
bother the control unit will, at least partly, depend on the profit (or more correctly
the rent) generated in the industry. The higher the rent generated per boat, the more
valuable is a license to operate in the industry and the more a rational actor will
spend on a rent-seeking activity like that of acquiring an extra license. The adminis-
trative rules created to govern the capacity of the fishing fleet also govern the distri-
bution of the rent. As is usual where rent-seeking is worthwhile, high profits induce
increased rent-seeking activity and induce increased incentives to circumvent the
rules. Thus, both cost of control and lobbying expenses soar with increased profits






 γ Π (5)
Here LS is total cost (measured in man-power units, say) of both inspection and sur-
veillance of the fishing fleet and in addition to lobbyist expenses. S(·) is a cost func-
tion relating rent-per-boat and man-power units needed for surveillance. The S(·)
function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with S′ (·) > 0 and S″ (·) > 0,
reflecting the assumption that surveillance cost increases as profits per unit increase.
Surveillance costs are assumed to increase with profit per unit at an increasing rate. The
parameter γ  is a shift parameter that will be set equal to one for most of the analysis.
Often fisheries management is presented as the act of fixing the number of li-
censes, for example n. However, in the present model the capacity of the operating
fleet will be related to the amount of regulation. Consider the following examples. A
trawler can increase its capacity by reducing the mesh size in its trawls. If control is
lax it will not be costly for trawlers to evade the mesh size regulation. As another
example, a given area may be closed for given types of gear and/or given types of
boats for specified periods of time. If control is lax it is relatively cheap to evade
those rules. Such evasion would literally increase the number of boats operating in
the given area. Thus a lax control regime will increase the real capacity of the fish-
ing fleet. These examples should indicate that the conduct of fisheries management
is a question of amount, that is of how much man-power and other resources society
is willing to forego on controls instead of using them in productive activities. In
other words, fisheries management is not satisfactorily conducted by announcing a
target for y or n. Some active surveillance and control is also needed. Thus when the
government announces its target for n (or y) it has to take into account that such an-
nouncement commits resources both for control and on rent-seeking. Resources used
on control and rent-seeking reduce resources available for productive use:
7 The type of annoyance that a would-be entrant might create for the control unit varies with the type of
regulation used. Suppose that a vessel’s fishing effort is used as the control variable, and the rule is that
a new vessel is only allowed to replace older vessels of equal capacity. There is no obvious rule to regu-
late how a vessel with up-to-date equipment is to be measured against (sometimes many) outdated ones.
Thus, much bureaucratic effort must be put into rule-making in this area, and moreover the would-be
boat owners would have every incentive to challenge and re-challenge the rules with every technological
advance. Using other variables as control variables could alleviate the need for rules defining fishing
effort but would of course create other definitional problems. It should be kept in mind that rule-making
at this level commands high-level skills in a number of fields, including law, economics, engineering,
and communication technology, so that activity quickly becomes costly.Why Fishing Fleets Tend to be “Too Big” 177
Y = F(L – LS) (6)
where Y is the income generated in sectors other than the fishing sector and L – LS is
available resources for use in sectors other than fishing.8 F(·) is a well behaved pro-
duction function with F′ (·) > 0 and F″ (·) < 0.
In this model we have divided the public into two groups: The owners of fishing
firms (also referred to as boat owners) and the general public. The general public
provides the resources for conducting fisheries management and receives (1 – P) of
profits generated in the fishing sectors. Thus, total income (VP) accruing to the gen-
eral public (excluding the boat owners9) is given as:
VP = (1 – P)Π  + F(L – Ls) (7)



















′ ⋅ ′ ⋅
⋅= 10 ––




The entity {1 – P – γ (F′ S′ /n)} reflects gains to the public as boat owner profits
increase by one dollar. The proportion (1 – P) indicates increase in taxes accruing,
while γ (F′ S′ /n) reflects increased costs of controlling as fishing gets more attractive
with increased profitability. The entity γ (F′ S′ /n)(Π /n) reflects costs of control per
fishing unit. Utilizing (1) and (2) to calculate dΠ /dn and Π /n and inserting into (8)
yields:
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Solving for n yields the optimal number of boats of the managed fishery, nFM (where
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8 It is assumed that the fishery sells its product and buys inputs from “foreigners” at fixed (world mar-
ket) prices. This assumption reflects the situation in small fishery dependent economies such as Iceland
and the Faroe Islands.
9 A different interpretation of VP would be to assume that all rent accruing to boat owners (PΠ ) got lost
in boat-owner paid rent-seeking activities, as for instance, paying professionals for finding loopholes in
the existing fishery management set of rules, using real resources to change vessels so as to utilize loop-
holes, etc. Given this interpretation, VP would represent the total GNP, not only GNP accruing to the
general public.Matthiasson 178
In other words, it is not optimal for the general public to supply so much surveil-
lance and control that aggregated boat-owner profits are maximized. The wedge be-
tween the number of licenses that would maximize boat-owner profits and the num-
ber of licenses that maximizes general public income depends on: (i) productivity of
resources in alternative use [F′ (·)]; (ii) effectiveness of controls [S′ (.)]; (iii) the share
of the fishery rent that accrues to the general public (1 – P); and (iv) the shift param-
eter γ . The comparative statics of a change in the rent share (P) and the shift param-
eter (γ ) with respect to the number of boats is discussed in the next section of the
paper. Note that a shift in productivity of resources in alternative use will imply an
increase in the number of licenses, while increased effectiveness of controls [lower
S′ (·) for a given level of per-unit-rent] would have the opposite effect. It is safe to
assume that productivity of resources in alternative use [F′ (·)] in a well developed
economy are non-zero. Hence, according to equation (10), the fishery managers
would only set number of licenses equal to the rent-maximizing number of licenses,
if a change in per-unit-rent (Π /n) would not affect control costs. In the remainder of
the paper it will be assumed that S′ (·) > 0.
Effects of Changing the Distribution of Rent and of a Shift in Control
Avoidance
According to the present model, government has to balance costs and benefits when
allocating funds to fishery management control and administration. It is therefore
natural to ask: How will changes in division of rents affect level of control and opti-












Thus, the higher is the share of regulation-created rents that accrues to the boat own-
ers, the higher the number of boats that the government will tolerate in the fishing
grounds. Observe also that as long as γ F′ (·)S′ (·) < 1 – k, it will be possible to find a
value of P such that nFM = nFA. This implies that if the share of regulation-created
rent that accrues to the general public is below some minimum, then the general
public will not supply enough control and surveillance so as to create rent.
One of the methods of fisheries management that has been discussed is some
form of auctioning out the right to catch a ton of fish. If all would-be bidders were
free to enter any number of bids, and if the auctioneer would be free to accept any bid,
potential rents would accrue to the auctioning body. In other words, the effect of such
auctioning could be traced in the present model by setting P = 0. Equation (10) yields
that no other value of P would give a lower value for the number of boats. Put differ-
ently, this regime would maximize rents created by the regulatory system.
It was assumed that the government restricts access to the fishery by administra-
tive rules. The regulated actors will have incentives to search for loopholes in those
rules. Eventually, as time goes by more and more loopholes will be found. As the
number of known loopholes increases, the cost of control will shift upward. In the
present model that could be simulated by increasing the value of the shift parameter
γ . We find that:
dn
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Thus, as boat owners gain more knowledge of the administrative systems, the gov-
ernment may find it optimal to increase the number of licenses. Alternatively, the
government might try to find ways to shift the cost of control downwards. This
could be done by introducing new administrative rules or alter the old rules that
would make the boat owner knowledge of loopholes obsolete.
Conclusions
There are two important lessons to be drawn from the present model. First, when
control of fishing capacity is costly, the method used to hand out the rights to utilize
the resource affects efficiency. Hence, the present model indicates that conclusions
drawn from models where management costs are ignored may not hold when, more
realistically, such costs are taken into account. Second, the willingness of the gov-
ernment to supply a fisheries management scheme will hinge on the amount of rents
accruing to the government compared to the amount of control and rent-seeking-ac-
tivity costs that the government will have to cover. In the long run, governments
will be less willing to supply the effort needed for fisheries management, surveil-
lance, and enforcement the smaller is the fraction of fishery rent thus created that
accrues to the general public. Furthermore, boat owners and governments are likely
to enter a regulation game where the regulated (the boat owners) use effort in order
to find loopholes in the established regulation schemes, while the regulator (the gov-
ernment) produces series of new regulatory rules. A new round in this game will be
started by boat owners discovering new loopholes in the existing regulation. Boat
owners will presumably use more effort to discover loopholes the bigger is their
share of the fishery rent. Hence, lowering the share of the fishery rent that accrues
to the boat owners may slow down this regulation game carousel and increase the
willingness of government to supply a fishery management scheme.
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